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I. INTRODUCTION
Awash with hortatory declarations and resolutions, international
human rights law is often criticized as too "soft," as lacking "teeth. ' 3
Indeed, even the "hardest" human rights standards, the binding multi-lateral
treaties, include little means of enforcement beyond international scrutiny,
which would exist even without human rights law.4 For this reason, human
rights norms embedded in national legislation take on an even more
important character, and there are few places where international human
rights law enters the domestic sphere so directly, and potently, as with
affirmative action.5 As the name implies, affirmative action is an active,
Hutchins Hall is the main academic building at the University of Michigan Law School, whose
affirmative action admissions policy is currently under constitutional scrutiny by the United States
Supreme Court. 2002 U.S. LEXIS 8677 (Dec. 2, 2002).
2 Hyderabad, India, was the sight of a forty-person massacre by extremist supporters of the reservation
policy who set an entire train carriage on fire. E.J. Prior, Constitutional Fairness or Fraud on the
Constitution? Compensatory Discrimination in India, 28 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 63 (1996).
. Jason Morgan-Foster is a JD candidate at the University of Michigan Law School and a graduate student
in Middle Eastern Studies at the University of Michigan. In Summer 2001, he was an intern for the
Human Rights Committee and the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination at the United
Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Geneva.
3 See DAVID J. BEDERMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW FRAMEWORKS 7-11 (2001) (noting and
criticizing the perceptions that international law generally is all theory and no practice, that it is not "real"
law, and that nobody obeys international law).
4 Although two treaty bodies now have a Rapporteur on follow-up to Concluding Observations, the power
given to this Rapporteur is dubious. See Follow-Up to Concluding Observations of the Committee
Against Torture, UN Doc. CERD/C/61/Misc.I 0 (Aug. 23, 2002,61st CERD session document); Follow-
up to Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee, UN Doc.: CERD/C/61/Misc. I1 (Aug.
23, 2002, 61st CERD session document). Many commentators have emphasized the need for stronger
enforcement mechanisms. See C. Heyns & F. Viljoen, The Impact of the United Nations Human Rights
Treaties on the Domestic Level 26 (2002) ("In many instances it is clear that concluding observations are
being ignored"); Elizabeth Evatt, Ensuring Effective Supervisory Procedures: The Need for Resources, in
THE FUTURE OF UN HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY MONITORING 461 (Philip Alston & James
Crawford eds., 2000); Philip Alston, Beyond 'Them' and 'Us': Putting Treaty Body Reform into
Perspective, in Id. at 501; Strengthening Support to and Enhancing the Effectiveness of the Treaty Bodies,
informal Note on the Deliberations of the Commission on Human Rights at its Fifty-Eighth Session on
Agenda Item 18(a) Entitled "Effective Functioning of the Human Rights Mechanisms: Treaty Bodies,"
UN Doc. HRIIMC/2002/Misc.I (June 14,2002).
A comparative law paper on affirmative action would not be complete without at least some discussion
of the terminology. Often, papers comparing Europe and the United States will choose consistent usage
of either "affirmative action" or "positive action." See Christopher McCrudden, Rethinking Positive
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dynamic force. This force strikes at the heart of social power structures-
taken to the extreme, affirmative action is a powerful tool for badly-needed
redistribution of social wealth.6 In a world where human rights norms are
mostly declaring or recommending, affirmative action is acting.
Here at the University of Michigan, no topic is currently more
charged or more debated than affirmative action. Recently, the Supreme
Court of the United States granted certiorari to Grutter v. Bollinger,7 the
affirmative action case arising out of the law school's admissions program,
and Gratz v. Bollinger,' the companion case in undergraduate admissions.
The campus is alive with daily organizational meetings for a march on
Washington DC during the Supreme Court's consideration of the case this
spring.9 A coalition of minority law student groups is working non-stop to
submit an amicus brief to the United States Supreme Court. CNN has called
the cases "the most significant civil right cases the Supreme Court will have
decided in the last quarter century."' 0 At the University of Michigan, and in
the United States, the time is now to talk about affirmative action.
The potential for comparative studies of affirmative action programs
is enormous. Not only is the issue present in multiple jurisdictions on
multiple continents, but it is always extremely politically charged and
Action, 15 INDUS. L. J. 219, 220-21 (1986) (discussing the terms "affirmative action" and "positive
action" at length and deciding not to distinguish between the two terms because "there is no real
difference in substance between them"). Because I am writing in the United States, I will consistently
employ the term "affirmative action" to designate both "affirmative action" and "positive action." Yet, it
stands to be said that the extent to which the two terms are synonymous is dependant upon the level of
generalization one chooses to adopt in defining them. The terms are synonymous if one considers the
meaning of the two terms generally, to denote positive measures undertaken by the state "to enable or to
facilitate the exercise of certain human rights by specific groups of citizens," Louise Mulder, How
Positive can Equality Measures Be? in NON-DISCIRIMINATION LAW: COMPARATIVE
PERSPECTIVES 65 (Titia Loenen & Peter R. Rodrigues eds., 1999). If one includes within the meaning
of the terms the myriad different ways, tests, and standards in which the two jurisdictions attempt to reach
that end, the two terms differ significantly. In this paper, I attempt to expose those similarities and
differences, as well as the many similarities and differences offered by Indian reservation policy. Some
commentators have argued that the Indian term "compensatory discrimination" is also synonymous with
affirmative action. Samuel M. Witten, Comment, "Compensatory Discrimination" in India: Affirmative
Action as a Means of Combating Class Inequality, 21 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 353, n.2 (1983). I
refuse to take this step. For me, the absolute, restrictive quotas (see discussion of quotas, infra section
IliA) that are integral to the Indian reservation system merit a separate term, despite other common areas.
I will therefore refer to the India system as "reservations."
6 McCrudden, supra note 5, at 238-39 (explaining the rationales for affirmative action based on
distributive justice and social utility).
7 Grutter v. Bollinger, 2002 U.S. LEXIS 8677 (Dec. 2, 2002).
a Gratz v. Bollinger, 2002 U.S. LEXIS 8681 (Dec. 2, 2002).
9 Email sent to students by the Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action & Integration and Fight for
Equality By Any Means Necessary (BAMN), Dec. 2, 2002 (on file with the author). A major conference
on affirmative action was also hosted at the University of Michigan on Jan. 20-26, 2003. See schedule at
http://www.banin.com/doc/2002/0301 -summit.txt.
1o William Mears, Affirmative Action Case Awaits Supreme Court Review, CNN, Dec. 2, 2002, available
at http://www.cnn.com.
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jurisprudentially complicated. Indeed, many commentators have analyzed
the United States' approach as compared to either Europe or India. Yet, very
little has been written comparing Europe and India, where many of the most
interesting questions lie, and a comparative analysis of all three jurisdictions
has not been attempted to my knowledge. This paper aims to fill that gap. I
will generally address affirmative action in the United States with respect to
race, in Europe with respect to gender, and in India with respect to caste. I
will address United States affirmative action programs with respect to gender
in certain limited sections of this paper, because the parallel to Europe is so
ripe for comparison. I will also address India's gender-based reservation
policy in part VI, but to a lesser extent, since it is significantly less developed
than caste-based reservations.
In this paper, I frame the affirmative action question in India,
Europe, and the United States as three concentric circles: The largest circle,
that of India, represents the most liberal, expanded approach to affirmative
action. Within the largest Indian circle, lies a more restrictive European
circle. Within this circle, lies the most restrictive jurisdiction: the United
States. All three jurisdictions share common themes, thus all three circles
overlap, but the main goal of this paper is to highlight the subtle ways in
which they differ. A study of all three jurisdictions allows for a depth of
analysis which is not possible when comparing only two jurisdictions. We
will see, for example, that one of the most complex issues, equality, is best
understood by examining the gray area that separates the European circle
from the larger Indian circle and the smaller American one. In most areas,
such as the notion of equality and the meaning of quotas, I will argue that
European policies are closer to their United States than their Indian
counterparts. However, I will also examine specific areas, such as the
general remedial rationale, the creamy layer concept, and the size of quotas
(or quota-like sums), where Europe is more similar to India. Synthesizing
these arguments, it is clear that affirmative action programs are not all alike:
Just as many forces play on Europe to pull it outwards towards India or
inwards towards the United States, these same forces also pull and push on
the Indian and American circles. The paper concludes with an analysis of
the universalist/cultural relativist question raised by the multiple
jurisdictional differences I will expose.
II. EQUALITY
All three jurisdictions have equal protection clauses that are
strikingly similar upon initial examination:
2003]
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A) "The State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or
the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India."
- Indian Constitution"
B) "[T]here shall be no discrimination whatsoever on grounds of sex
either directly or indirectly by reference in particular to marital or
family status.
- Equal Treatment Directive of the European
Communities 2
C) "No State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.
- Constitution of the United States 3
In addition, Europe and India also both have exceptions clauses
allowing affirmative action measures in some situations:
A) "Nothing in this article or in clause (2) of article 29 shall prevent the
State from making any special provision for the advancement of any
socially and educationally backward classes of citizens or for the
Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes."
- Indian Constitution'
4
B) "This Directive shall be without prejudice to measures to promote
equal opportunity for men and women, in particular by removing
existing inequalities which affect women's opportunities in the areas
referred to in Article 1(1)."
- Equal Treatment Directive of the European
Communities
15
"INDIAN CONST. art. XIV.
'2 Equal Treatment Directive, art. 11, § 1, Council Directive 76/207, 1976 O.J. (L 39/40) (hereinafter the
Equal Treatment Directive). Admittedly, the Equal Treatment Directive differs in that it is limited to sex.
This does not create a significant distinction in this paper, however, since I am comparing affirmative
action programs in their specific areas of emphasis. See supra Part I.
13 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
" INDIAN CONST. art. XV, § 4. See also INDIAN CONST. art. XVI, § 4 (a similar exceptions clause
relating to equality of opportunity in public employment which specifically allows reservations for
backwards classes); INDIAN CONST. art. VCVI ("The State shall promote with special care the
educational and economic interests of the weaker sections of the people, and, in particular, of the
Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes, and shall protect them from social injustice and all forms of
exploitation.") (non-binding Directive Principle of State Policy).
1S Equal Treatment Directive, art. II, § I, Council Directive 76/207, 1976 O.J. (L 39/40).
[Vol. 9:73
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Faced with this juridical background, one is likely to make two
assumptions: First, that all three jurisdictions will be bound by a similar
notion of equality. Second, because of their exceptions clauses, that Europe
and India will be relatively less constrained by their respective equal
protection clauses than the United States. In this section, I investigate the
ways in which the reality proves more complicated than both of these
assumptions. Instead of a consistent notion of equality, I will examine two
theoretical divides in the concept of equality, both of which are present in the
jurisdictions under study.16 In part A, I compare the three jurisdictions by
examining the concept of equality adopting the theoretical divide between
individual-regarding equality and group-regarding equality. Rather than the
divide coming between Europe/India on the one hand and the United States
on the other hand, the equality divide comes between India on the one hand
and Europe/USA on the other. In Part B, I examine the divide between
formal equality and substantive equality. I will argue that although it has
been commonly argued that this divide does come between Europe/USA on
the one hand and India on the other, there is much evidence to suggest that
Europe is gradually adopting a substantive notion of equality, expanding
away from the inner American circle and towards the outer Indian one.
A. Individual-Regarding Equality vs. Group-Regarding Equality
In the 1970s, Douglas Rae and his colleagues at Yale embarked on
ground-breaking work studying the notion of equality. In their analysis, Rae
et al. developed the dichotomy between "individual-regarding equality,"
which defines a class of individuals and demands they be treated equally, and
"group-regarding equality," which seeks equality between groups, but not
necessarily within each group. 17  This distinction is key in comparing
affirmative action to reservations. Although the language of equality figures
prominently in all three jurisdictions, it is not always the same equality in
Rae's dichotomy. Both Europe and the United States are more solidly
grounded in an individual-regarding equality assumption. In Adarand
Constructors v. Pena (hereinafter Adarand), the United States Supreme
Court has made clear that "the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
Constitution protect persons, not groups."' 8 Similarly, in Europe, Klaartje
16 For an even more complete investigation of concept of equality, distinguishing four separate notions of
equality, see Anne Peters, The Many Meanings of Equality and Positive Action in Favour of Women under
European Community Law -- A Conceptual Analysis, 2 EUR. L. J. 177 (1996).
17 See generally DOUGLAS RAE ET AL., EQUALITIES (1981).
" Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995). See also Donald W. Jackson, Affirmative
Action in Comparative Perspective: India and the United States, in NON-DISCIRIM [NATION LAW:
2003]
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Wentholt argues that the EC Equal Treatment Directive of 1976 (hereinafter
The Equal Treatment Directive) is based on a "presumption of sameness"'1 9
which recognizes "the right of each individual to be treated equally."'  In
contrast to this individual-regarding equality, reservations in India are based
on group-regarding equality. Priya Sridharan characterizes the importance of
group-regarding equality in India:
The Constitution charges the government with promoting these
groups' interests, and explicitly permits the use of reservations or
other preferences to repeal the negative consequences of
membership in a "backward class." Therefore, the Indian
government, including the judiciary, need not debate whether
equality must always entail ignoring potentially salient group
membership, or whether group membership can, in fact, be
ignored. Similarly, attempts to justify caste-based assistance need
not work around a vague or inflexible mandate for equality. In
fact, arguments for preferential treatment marshal the Constitution
strongly in their favor. Instead, debate inheres in attempting to
define "backward classes" - those who have suffered the kind of
disadvantage that calls for the remedy of reservations. Thus, in




Thus, reservation policies differ from affirmative action because the
fundamental underlying assumptions are different. While the United States
and Europe practice an individual-regarding equality, India's reservation
policy is based on group-regarding equality.
22
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 249 (Titia Loenen & Peter R. Rodrigues eds., 1999) ("The United
States is the quintessential home of individual-regarding equality. The deceptively simple idea that all
human beings are equal and ought to be treated alike-as individuals-continues its appeal to many
Americans, even if its appeal is only at a reflexive level of understanding."). Jackson also notes that
individual-regarding equality is so ingrained in the American psyche that, in the Bakke case, "the notion
of 'group-regarding equality' was not specifically raised by any of the briefs that supported the position of
the University of California." Id. at 252.
'9 Klaartje Wentholt, Formal and Substantive Equal Treatment: The Limitations and the Potential of the
Legal Concept of Equality, in NON-DISCIRIMINATION LAW: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 53,
55 (Titia Loenen & Peter R. Rodrigues eds., 1999).20 Id. at 60.
21 Priya Sridharan, COMMENT: Representations of Disadvantage: Evolving Definitions of Disadvantage
in India's Reservation Policy and United States' Affirmative Action Policy, 6 ASIAN L.J. 99, 108 (1999).
22 But see Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1970). In that case, the United States Supreme Court
"shifted civil rights policy to a group-rights, equality-of-result rationale that made the social consequences
of employment practices, rather than their purposes, intent or motivation, the decisive consideration in
determining their lawfulness." HERMAN BELZ, EQUALITY TRANSFORMED 51 (1991). Although
the case has been distinguished and criticized by literally hundreds of Supreme Court majority opinions, it
is still an interesting read-the similarities to later Indian cases is uncanny.
[Vol. 9:73
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It is tempting to argue that India's "creamy layer"23 test puts the
emphasis in India on group-regarding equality into question. One might
reason that, if India were truly concerned only with group rights, it would not
be necessary to institute the "creamy layer" test to separate out individuals
who, because of privileged situations, should not qualify for the group
benefit. By this line of reasoning, the "creamy layer" test, in essence, is an
individual test, making the final decision in India more an individual one
than a group one. I believe this reasoning is incorrect, however. In the
United States/European context, the "individualizing" of affirmative action
focuses the attention on the individual who would be denied something
because of the operation of an affirmative action program. In India, the
"creamy layer" test invokes an entirely different individual enquiry, that of
the individual who would benefit from the reservation policy, and whether
their individual characteristics should preclude them from benefiting for a
reservation meant for a particular group.24 Sridharan notes that "While the
creamy layer test individualizes some members of the group, it does so only
in service of maintaining the efficacy and/or fairness of the group status as a
proxy for disadvantage., 25  "The creamy layer test simply expels, as
individuals, those people whose individual situation characterizes them as
inconsistent with the group. The starting point of calculating disadvantage is
still the group., 26  Thus, what looks like an increased emphasis on
individuals is actually a tool to maintain the emphasis on the groups, by
keeping the groups meaningfully distinct in terms of level of disadvantage.
Nevertheless, it is fair to say that the line between individual-
regarding equality and group-regarding equality is not a clear one in any of
the jurisdictions under study. In India, while the preference is on groups, it
would certainly be an oversimplification of the issue to claim the absence of
individual-regarding equality or some level of importance of the individual:
23 The "creamy layer" test is an economic means test designed to limit the possibility of advanced
backward class members profiting from the reservation schemes. See description infra section V and in
indra Sawhney v. Union of India, A.IR. 1993 S.C. 477, at 86.
24 Sridharan, supra note 2 1, at 112 ("In the U.S., the permissibility of an individual to benefit from
affirmative action based partly on her group membership is weighed against the right of a nonbeneficiary
individual to receive the position in contention, or the injury he suffers by losing the position in part
because he is not a member of the beneficiary group. In India, however, the counterweight to a benefit
garnered by someone solely because of group membership is his socioeconomic status - a measure of
whether he, in fact, suffers disadvantage consistent with the claimed group membership, and is thereby
entitled to the remedial benefits accruing to that group. Thus, even the counterweights to granting
reservations operate to maintain the primacy of the group as the unit of remedy.") (footnotes omitted).
25 Sridharan, supra note 21 , at 120.
26 Sridharan, supra note 21, at 146 (emphasis added) (adding that "Just as the U.S. uses group membership
to determine individual qualifications, India uses individual characteristics to maintain the salience of the
group as the primary organizing variable").
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India was self-consciously a nation comprised not just of atomized
individuals, but of several societies in which these individuals
were grouped. Individuals were avowedly locations for the
residence of complexes and compendiums of these many group
identities. Thus, while championing the individual's right to
equality, the Constituent Assembly could not ignore the group as a
fundamental organizational unit. The Indian Constitution reflected
these tensions, creating flexibility for the interpretation and
adjudication of the conflicts between individual and group rights.
27
The same could be said about Europe and the United States. While
both of those jurisdictions clearly favor individual-regarding equality, the
very fact that an affirmative action debate exists is strong evidence of some
understanding of group-regarding equality. For example, Donald W.
Jackson argues that "programs which provide for affirmative action for
members of traditionally disadvantaged groups [are] based on group-
regarding equality. '28  Thus, while India can clearly be distinguished from
Europe and the United States in terms of its level of group-regarding
equality, it would be an oversimplification to claim that either individual-
regarding equality or group-regarding equality is absent from any one of the
three jurisdictions.
B. Formal Equality vs. Substantive Equality
The concept of equality can also be divided into the two separate
notions of formal equality and substantive equality. Much has been written
about the distinction between formal and substantive equality, particularly by
commentators in Europe. 29  Simplifying the distinction to its core, formal
equality aims at equal opportunity as opposed to substantive equality, which
aims at equal results by considering societal structures in which equal results
would not necessarily follow from equal opportunity." Paul Hodapp,
27 Sridharan, supra note 21, at 106 (citations omitted).
28 Jackson, supra note 18, at 249. Similarly, after the recent decision in Hopwood v. State of Texas 78
F.2d 932 (5th Cir. 1996), Jackson explained the diametrically opposing views among the law faculty at
the University of Texas Law School as "having little to do with legal analysis, but rather represent[ing]..
. fundamentally different understandings of equality." Id. at 255-56
29 See Mulder, supra note 5; Wentholt, supra, note 19.
30 Paul Hodapp, Thomas Trelogan, & Steve Mazurana, Positive Action and European Union Law in the
Year2000, 8 ANN. SURV. INT'L & COMP. L. 33, 36 (2002). Note that this article is not to be confused
with Steve Mazurana, Thomas Trelogan, & Paul Hodapp, International Decision: Badeck, Abrahamsson
v. Fogelqvist, Schnorbus v. Land Hessen, 96 AJ.I.L. 453 (2002). Although this second article has
identical authorship, it is an entirely different article with some different information. I will refer to the
former as "Hodapp et al." and the latter as "Mazurana et al."
[Vol. 9:73
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Thomas Trelogan, and Steve Mazurana recently argued that the ECJ "has
accepted formal or competitive positive action as the only permissible means
to achieve gender equality."3' Similarly, in her excellent work on equality,
Klaartje Wentholt argues that the legal notion of equality in Europe has been
generally limited to the formal component, and advocates for a greater
incorporation of substantive equality into the legal notion of equality in
Europe. 32 In this sub-section, I will first argue that India has firmly
embraced the notion of substantive equality. I will then explore this notion
in the context of the United States and Europe, arguing that while the United
States remains solidly grounded in formal equality, Europe has already
adopted a greater level of substantive equality than any of the above
commentators admit. In this way, the European circle is expanding away
from the American circle towards the Indian circle.
In her work, Wentholt exposes the connection between the
individual-regarding equality/group-regarding equality paradigm and the
formal equality/substantive equality paradigm:
In [a formal approach to equality], affirmative action infringes the
right of each individual to be treated equally. Therefore,
derogations should be interpreted strictly. In such an approach it is
difficult to justify affirmative action, for affirmative action does
not take individual characteristics but rather group characteristics
into account (being a woman, a member of an ethnic minority
group etcetera). So, [affirmative action] is contradictory to the
condition of not infringing an individual right .... In a substantive
approach affirmative action is not seen as an exception to the
concept of discrimination but as a component of the principle of
equality that forces the establishment of equality as a result.
33
Given this connection between group-regarding equality and
substantive equality, and given my discussion of India's recognition of
group-regarding equality supra, one would expect India to adopt a
substantive approach to equality, and this is in fact the case. Wentholt argues
that a substantive approach is more likely to treat affirmative action not as an
exception to equal treatment but as a necessary component of it, and several
important Indian decisions argue this precise point. In State of Kerala v.
31 Id. But see id. at 34-35 ("A new paragraph 4 of Article 119 of the Treaty of Rome (now 141 of the
Treaty of Amsterdam) ... permits the use of positive action not only as a means to formal or competitive
equality but also as a means to substantive equality for women.").
32 Wentholt, supra note 19, at 53 (distinguishing "equality as an abstract, more theoretical principle
from] equality as a concrete legal norm").
3 d. at 60.
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Thomas, the Supreme Court argues that Article 16(4) of the Indian
Constitution is not an exception to Article 16(1) to be interpreted narrowly
but rather clarifies and explains that classifications based on backwardness
are permissible under Article 16(1)).1 4  The Thomas Court concludes that
"[t]he quality and concept of equality is that if persons are dissimilarly
placed they cannot be made equal by having the same treatment. 35 In Indra
Sawhney v. Union of India, the Court holds that Article 16(4) of the Indian
Constitution was not an exception to 16(1) but rather merely an explicit
statement of classifications and provisions for backward classes that were
already implicitly stated in Article 16(1).36 By interpreting affirmative action
not as the exception to equal treatment but as part of equal treatment itself,
India has adopted a substantive notion of equality.
I now turn to the question of substantive equality in the United States
and Europe. Although in other sections I address the highly relevant race
affirmative action programs in the United States, in this section I attempt to
facilitate comparison by focusing on affirmative action programs based on
gender. Because different levels of United States Constitutional scrutiny
develop in substantively different areas such as race and gender,37 a
comparison between affirmative action programs is more accurate if limited
to one area. Whereas the United States debate has a race and gender
component, the affirmative action debate in Europe is focused almost
exclusively on gender. Therefore, the common ground for comparison,
which I will adopt in this section, is with respect to gender.38
"' State of Kerala v. Thomas, 63 A.I.R. (S.C.) at 499.
35 Thomas. supra note 34, at 502 45. See also id. at 499 31 ("The principle of equality does not mean
that every law must have universal application for all persons who are not by nature, attainment or
circumstances in the same position and the varying needs ofdifferent classes of persons require special
treatment.... Equality means parity of treatment under parity of conditions. Equality does not connote
absolute equality.").
36 Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, 80 A.I.R. (S.C.) at 477, 539 (overruling Balaji and Devadasan, infra
note 62, on this point). The Court also notes that "We . .. firmly believe that given an opportunity,
members of these classes are bound to overcome their initial disadvantages and would compete with-and
may, in some cases, excel-members of open competitor candidates. It is undeniable that nature has
endowed upon members of backward classes as much as it has endowed upon members of other classes
and that what is required is an opportunity to prove it. It may not, therefore, be said that reservations are
antimeritarian." Id. at 574-75, cited in Jackson, supra note 18, at 261.
37 In the United States, distinctions based on gender receive intermediate scrutiny, whereas distinctions
based on race receive strict scrutiny. Compare United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (subjecting
gender-based classifications to intermediate scrutiny), with Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200,
235 (1995) (requiring strict scrutiny for any race-based classifications imposed by government actor).
3s See also Part VI, infra, noting that employing a similar technique with respect to India causes many of
the distinctions drawn in this paper to significantly diminish. Despite this fact, I do not focus on gender-
based affirmative action in India both because its case law is less developed and because it certainly
cannot be said to generally represent the ideology of Indian reservation policy as perceived in India and
elsewhere.
[Vol. 9:73
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The seminal case regarding affirmative action based on gender in the
United States, particularly "tie break" schemes comparable to those in the
European context, is Johnson v. Transportation Agency of Santa Clara
County.39 In that case, the Supreme Court held that considering gender in
promotion decisions as one factor in a "moderate, flexible, case-by-case
approach to effecting a gradual improvement in the representation of
minorities and women in the Agency's work force" was "fully consistent
with Title Vl1.,, 40  To reach this decision, the Court employed a three-part
standard it had established in United States Steelworkers of America v.
Weber4' for race-based affirmative action and applied it to gender based
affirmative action.42 According to the Weber standard, an affirmative action
program must meet three essential requirements: 1) It must be implemented
in response to an underrepresentation in the workforce, 2) It must not
infringe upon the rights of those not within the underrepresented class, and 3)
It must serve only as a mechanism to reach a balanced workforce, not to
perpetuate that newly attained balanced workforce.43
The European companion case to Johnson is Marschall,44 which set
standards for affirmative action programs after the ambiguous Kalanke
decision. 45  In contrast to Johnson's three-part standard, the ECJ in
Marschall creates a two-part standard that upholds affirmative action
programs which: 1) guarantee each equally-qualified male candidate "an
objective assessment which will take account of all criteria specific to the
individual candidates and will override the priority accorded to female
candidates where one or more of those criteria tilts the balance in favour of
39 Johnson v. Transp. Agency of Santa Clara County, 480 U.S. 616 (1987).
40 Id. at 642 (referring to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the major statutory basis for civil rights
law in the United States).
41 U.S. Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979).42 Johnson, 480 U.S. at 634-39.
43 Arnie Needham, Comment, Leveling the Playing Field - Affirmative Action in the European Union: A
Comparison ofMarschall v. Land Nordrhein-Westfalen and Johnson v. Transportation Agency of Santa
Clara County, 19 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 479, 490-91 (2000).
44 C-409/95, Marschall v. Land Nordrhein-Westfalen, All ER (EC) 865 (1997) (hereinafter Marschall).
45 In a Comment, written before Badeck. Abrahammsson, and Lommers, Amie Needham engages in a
detailed comparison of Johnson to Marschall, arguing that "[o]n its face, the Johnson decision looks quite
similar to the ECJ's holding in Marschall. However, upon greater scrutiny, it becomes evident that the
ECJ has made it much easier for women to benefit from voluntary gender-based affirmative action
programs than has the United States Supreme Court." Needham, supra note 43, at 481. For a critique on
just how ambiguous and unsatisfactory the Kalanke decision was, see Katherine Cox, Positive Action in
the European Union: From Kalanke to Marschall, 8 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 101, 123-28 (1998)
(referring to Case C-450/93, Eckhard Kalanke v. Freie Hansestadt-Bremen, All ER (EC) 66, 1 C.M.L.R.
175 (1996)).
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the male candidate" and 2) does not include criteria which discriminate
against female candidates.46
Differences between Johnson's three-part standard and Marschall's
two-part standard exemplify the differing directions of the United States and
European debate on gender-based affirmative action. The United States
Supreme Court's focus is on numerical equality, as evidenced by Johnson's
first and third prongs, requiring proof of underrepresentation in the
workforce and cessation of the program upon parity.47 In focusing on
numerical equality rather than underlying prejudices, the first and third
prongs of the Johnson standard are geared towards formal equality. For the
European Court, striving for substantive equality, the focus of the standard is
on underlying prejudices. It stresses plans that "counteract the ... effects on
female candidates of'48 "prejudices and stereotypes concerning the role and
capacities of women in working life."' 9 In Marschall, it therefore upheld a
national law which noted that "where qualifications are equal, employers
tend to promote men rather than women because they apply traditional
promotion criteria which in practice put women at a disadvantage, such as
age, seniority and the fact that a male candidate is a head of household and
sole breadwinner for the household." 50 The Marschall Court held that "the
mere fact that a male candidate and a female candidate are equally qualified
does not mean that they have the same chances."5' 52 Needham notes the
4Marschall. supra note 44, at 35.
47 In fairness, I am primarily comparing the standards in Johnson and Marschall in this section. At
points, if one compares every detail of the two cases, some of the distinctions I draw are diminished. For
example, Cox argues that achieving formal gender balance was in fact a requirement for the legitimacy of
the plan in Marschall even if not embodied in the standard. Cox, supra note 45, at 136. Nevertheless, I
justify a narrower comparison limited to the standards because the main principles which a court chooses
to sum up in a standard and embody in the holding, are those it considers the most significant.
48 Marschall, supra note 44, at 3 I.
49 Id. 29. The Court also quotes Council Recommendation (EEC) 84/635 on this point, which reads
"existing legal provisions on equal treatment, which are designed to afford rights to individuals, are
inadequate for the elimination of all existing inequalities unless parallel action is taken by governments,
both sides of industry and other bodies concerned, to counteract the prejudicial effects on women in
employment which arise from social attitudes, behaviour and structures." Id. 28.
0 Id. 4, cited in Eva Brems, Comment, Hellmut Marschall v. Nordrhein-Westfalen, 4 COLUM J. EUR. L.
668, 674, 669 (1998). The Court also demands "recognition of the child-raising experience, care of
families and elder persons, and unpaid social work as qualifications for most jobs, or as factors upon
which a decision not to hire may not be based." Julie A. Mertus, Marschall v. Land Nordrhein-Westfalen,
AM. J. INT'L L. 296, 300 (1997). See also Needham, supra note 43, at 495 ("Experts in the study of
affirmative action have become increasingly convinced that the underrepresentation of women in many
professional occupations is due to 'structural elements which are extremely difficult to tackle using only
traditional anti-discrimination legislation."') (citing Brems, supra, at 674).
51 Marschall, supra note 44, at 30.
52 The Marschall standard also takes another additional step beyond the Johnson approach. In its second
prong, the Marschall standard aims to eliminate pretextual discrimination. Needham, supra note 43, at
494. This is an important addition, as it represents a shift in focus, an appropriate shift towards the very
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ECJ's increasing acceptance of substantive equality, stating that the
European approach "goes much further in promoting women in the
workplace than the 'strictly formal discrimination concepts' adhered to by
the Supreme Court." 3  Thus, while both jurisdictions still adhere to the
principles of formal equality more than substantive equality, Europe is
increasingly willing to consider the issue of substantive equality, marking a
shift, where the European circle expands away from the United States and
closer to the circle of India.
Developments subsequent to Marschall only solidify the increasing
importance of substantive equality in the European approach. The 1999
amendments to the Treaty of Amsterdam include a provision specifically
allowing for affirmative action programs based on substantive equality. 4 In
Badeck v. Hessischer Ministerprasident, Advocate General Saggio argues
that because of these changes to the EC Treaty, Article 2(4) of the Equal
Treatment Directive should no longer be strictly construed as an exception to
the fundamental right of equal treatment, and that "the principles of formal
and substantive equality are not completely at odds" except where arbitrary
or disproportionate to the needs of the disadvantaged group, paralleling the
Indian Supreme Court's reasoning almost perfectly." The ECJ in Badeck
approves of the national statutory requirements, which it says are "manifestly
intended to lead to an equality which is substantive rather than formal, by
reducing the inequalities which may occur in practice in social life."
' 6
Finally, in Lommers v. Minister van Landbouw, Natuurbeheer en Visserj,
the Court specifically addresses the equality of opportunity/substantive
equality issue, holding that a plan which aims to achieve substantive equality
by reserving spaces in subsidized nursery facilities is consistent with
Community law.5 7 The Court stated that "it is settled case-law that Article
2(4) is specifically and exclusively designed to authorize measures which,
although discriminatory in appearance, are in fact intended to eliminate or
group affirmative that action is meant to protect. Thus, while the United States standard remains focused
on the rights of the majority group in its second standard, the European standard shifts the focus entirely
towards added emphasis on rights of the minority group.
-3 Needham, supra note 43, at 496 (citing Brems, supra note 50 at 674).
' TREATY OF AMSTERDAM (formerly Treaty of Rome) Art. 141(4), 4 Eur. Union L. Rep. (CCH)
?ara. 25,500 at 10526-7 (ratified May 1, 1999).
Case C-I 58/97, Lommers v. Minister van Landbouw, Natuurbeheer en Visserij, E.C.I 2000 Page 1-
01875, 126-30 (Mar. 28, 2000) (opinion of the A-G Saggio).
56 Id. 32. But see Hodapp et al., supra note 30, at 36 (The "[c]ourt, unlike this AG, has accepted formal
or competitive positive action as the only permissible means to achieve gender equality, understood in
terms of the goal of removing obstacles to equal opportunity for women. The Court appears to believe that
its position is a compromise between permitting no gender discrimination whatsoever and promoting
substantive equality for women."). In light of 32, which is quite explicit, I believe the Court recognizes
more substantive equality than the Hodapp article admits. Furthermore, the Court overwhelmingly
accepts preferential treatment, even quotas, in decisions up to the final employment decision.
57 Case C-476/99, E.CI. 2002 Page 1-02891, 50 (Mar. 19, 2002).
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reduce actual instances of inequality which may exist in the reality of social
life."
58
Thus, in comparing the standards employed in Johnson and
Marschall, I have attempted in this section to present Marschall as the
beginning of a line of cases which move towards an emphasis on substantive
equality, like that present in India, while Johnson focuses on formal equality.
Although supporters of affirmative action would certainly favor the
Marschall approach to the Johnson approach, some commentators have
argued that Marschall is considerably less powerful than I portray it.
Katherine Cox argues that Marschall relies on a superficial distinction in the
savings clause, which does not help to clarify Community law after the
ambiguous Kalanke judgment.59  She concludes that "[f]or this reason
Marschall must be regarded as very unsatisfactory, for it has failed to "clear
up the problem of how to resolve the clash between the basic legislation on
equal treatment and the creation of positive measures for the under-
represented sex. '60  In the end, however, even Cox agrees that, "[a]lthough
the ECJ failed to tackle the equality of results issue head on, it nevertheless
has substituted a broader view of equal opportunity for a narrow one. It has
realized, without explicitly stating so, the merits of positive action in tackling
the real barriers that women face.,, 61  This "broader view" Cox notes is the
s8 Id. 32. It should be emphasized that I argue only that the European approach tends towards
substantive equality, not that it is already providing full substantive equality. Yet, even with this
compromised position, several commentators would disagree, such as Klaartje Wentholt, whom I have
relied on extensively for the theoretical basis for this section. Writing before Badeck, Lommers, and the
changes to the Treaty of Amsterdam, Wentholt argues that the Marschall court's approach is still
completely formal. Wentholt, supra note 19, at 60. For Wentholt, true substantive equality does not
merely allow the exception's clause to be viewed as part of the equal treatment rule, but requires that it be
viewed as such. Id. at 55. Wentholt argues that because the Equal Treatment Directive allows affirmative
action as an exception to equal treatment (rather than requiring it), plans based upon it will be formal and
not substantive. Still other commentators are rather non-committal in their perception of the ECJ's stance
on substantive equality. Compare Cox, supra note 45, at 138 ("Apart from a glimpse of the equality
issues surrounding positive action (one which belies the complexity of the concept of equality) the Court
did not even hint that it was aware of the equality of results/opportunity dichotomy. For this reason
Marschall must be regarded as very unsatisfactory."), with id. at 139 ("In Marschall, however, the Court
realized, at least implicitly, that giving equal opportunities, in the narrow sense of ensuring equal starting
points, was not enough to counteract inequalities between men and women in the employment arena. It
recognized that an equally qualified man and woman do not necessarily have the same opportunity to
achieve equal results because of the stereotypes and prejudices which burden women.").
59 Cox, supra note 45, at 136-40 (arguing that "[tlhe extent to which a saving clause actually changes the
nature of a quota system is debatable and thus the ECJ's characterization of the clause as a distinguishing
feature of the legislation is dubious"). Cox concludes that "while Marschall endorses the use of
preferential schemes to address gender inequalities in some instances, the overall future development of
positive action in Europe remains uncertain and unpredictable." Id. at 104.
Id. at 138-39 (quoting Vogel-Polsky, Disagreements About How to Interpret Marschall Judgment, EUR.
INFO. SERV., EURI REP (Jan. 28, 1998).
61 Id. at 140.
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increasing acceptance of substantive equality that I have described in this
section. Europe's middle circle is expanding once again.
III. QUOTAS
A. Type of Quota
In 1963, the Indian Supreme Court held that reservations for
backwards classes could meet but not exceed 50% of available seats.6" The
1979 Mandal Commission report therefore recommended combined
reservations totaling 49.5%.63 The Supreme Court has generally continued to
follow the 50% limit. 64 In this jurisdiction, reservations are quotas in the
dictionary sense: they are a proportion of seats that are reserved for a certain
group, to which another group is absolutely prevented access.6 5  In this
section, I will first distinguish Europe/USA from India, arguing that in those
jurisdictions strict dictionary-definition quotas are definitely forbidden, and
even some "softer" quotas are also forbidden. I will then distinguish
between the European and American cases, arguing that the European
approach is slightly more flexible than the American one, placing Europe
once again between the United States and Indian spheres.
In the United States, there is no question that quotas in the Indian,
dictionary sense are absolutely prohibited. In Regents of the University of
California v. Bakke, Justice Powell, writing the judgment of the Court,
distinguished the University of California Davis Medical School's strict
quota of sixteen seats from the admissions plan at Harvard College, which
makes race a plus in an applicant's admissions file, leading to no strict
quotas.66  Although the narrowest-grounds holding of Bakke is one of the
most debated points in United States constitutional law,67 there is solid
62 Balaji v. State of Mysore, 50 A.I.R. (S.C.) 649, 663 (1963) (holding that the total percentage of
reservations permissible under Article 15(4) of the Indian Constitution generally should be less than
50%); Devadasan v. Union of India, I A.I.R. (S.C.) 179 (1964) (holding that unused reservations of a
previous year can not be carried forward and added to the reservations in a subsequent year if the total
number of reservations available in the subsequent year then exceeds 50%).
63 REPORT OF THE MANDAL COMMISSION, summarized in Prior, supra note 2, at 84-85. This
included a new 27% reservation of government positions for Other Backward Classes, in addition to the
previously existing quota reserving 22.5% of government positions for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled
Tribes. Id.
64 Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, 80 A.I.R. (S.C.) 477 at 94A (1993); Rajkumar v. Gulbarga Univ., 77
A.I.R. (Kant.) 320, 332 (1990) (also following the 50% limit established in Balaji).
65 MERRIAM WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY (20003), available at http://www.m-w.com (definining
"quota" as "[t]he share or proportion assigned to each in a division or to each member of a body).
66 Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 315-20 (1978) (Powell J. plurality).
67 Only a narrowest-grounds holding of the Supreme Court creates U.S. Constitutional law. Marks v.
United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) ("When a fragmented Court decides a case and no single
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agreement that Justice Powell's opinion certainly stood for the proposition
that a dictionary-like quota reserving 16 of 100 seats for applicants from
"economically and-or educationally disadvantaged backgrounds '68  is
unlawful: In the current case of Grutter v. Bollinger, Michigan's plan was
designed specifically to avoid the quotas that were fatal in Bakke,69 and
although innumerable points are debated between the majority and minority
in the 86-page opinion of the Grutter Circuit Court, the unconstitutionality of
strict quotas is accepted by the majority, 70 the dissent,7' and both of the
substantive concurrences.72 7
But, beyond this dictionary-definition of quota, quota is also used in
the United States to designate another phenomenon, which will also render a
plan unconstitutional: absolute tie breaks. Even in the absence of a
dictionary-definition quota reserving a certain percentage of seats, many
rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, the holding of the Court may be viewed
as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds.")
(interpreting Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966)). Bakke is highly debated because the court
split three ways, involving both a split over the approval of affirmative action and a split over the rationale
for affirmative action. The two splits do not parallel each other. Justice Powell struck down the
affirmative action plan on a diversity rationale. He was joined by Justices Stevens, Rehnquist, Burger,
and Stewart, who argued against affirmative action generally and thus concurred in the judgment insofar
as it struck down the plan. At the same time, Justice Powell was also joined by Justices Brennan, White,
Marshall, and Blackmun, who concurred in the judgment that a properly designed admissions program
would have been lawful, based on a remedial rationale.
6i Bakke, 438 U.S. at 273.
69 Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732,736 (6th Cir. 2002).
70 The majority held that "Justice Powell's opinion [in Bakke] sets forth two guidelines regarding race-
conscious admissions policies -(1) segregated, dual-track admissions systems utilizing quotas for under-
represented minorities are unconstitutional; and (2) an admissions policy modeled on the Harvard plan,
where race and ethnicity are considered a 'plus,' does not offend the Equal Protection Clause." Id. at 745-
46. The majority thus upheld the constitutionality of the Michigan plan precisely because it lacked a strict
quota system. Id. at 748 ("[W]e simply cannot conclude that the Law School is using the 'functional
equivalent' of the Davis Medical School quota struck down in Bakke.").
71 Although the Dissent devotes 14 pages to arguing that the holding of Bakke should be limited to the
narrow facts at issue in 1978, Grutter, 288 F.3d at 775-89, it nevertheless still generalizes upon the Bakke
holding for the proposition that "all plans that absolutely reserve a specific number of seats for the racially
favored ... [are] unconstitutional." Id. at 777.
72 Clay's concurrence upholding the Michigan plan reasons that "the balance certainly tips in favor of the
law school's representation that it does not employ a quota in the absence of any evidence to the
contrary." Id. at 770. Gilman, concurring with the dissent, holds that "the primary problem with the law
School's admissions policy is that the 'critical mass' of minority students that it seeks to enroll is
functionally indistinguishable from a quota." Id. at 816. The three other concurrences in this case related
to a procedural issue of the court, as well as the ethics of Judge Boggs's "Procedural Appendix" to the
dissent, addressing that issue. Id. at 752-58, 815.
73 It is interesting to note that the distaste for fixed quotas in the United States also creates some problems
in the law school's reasoning: Whereas the law school attempts to define a "critical mass of minority
applicants" vague enough so that it does not constitute a quota, it must nevertheless define it precisely
enough so as to meet narrow-tailoring analysis of United States Constitutional law. An insufficiently
defined "critical mass" was one of the reasons leading the District Court to conclude that the policy was
not narrowly tailored and therefore unconstitutional under strict scrutiny. Grutter v. Bollinger, 137 F.
Supp. 2d 821, 851 (E.D. Mich. 2001) ("Narrow tailoring is difficult, if not impossible, to achieve when
the contours of the interest being served are so ill-defined.").
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United States lawyers and judges view tie break schemes and absolute
preferences as creating a quota of one seat (the one in question) and therefore
as unconstitutional. Only when protected group status is one of many factors
is affirmative action constitutional.74
Europe, the middle circle, has characteristics that tend towards both
the Indian and American extremes. Like the United States, Europe maintains
a strong distaste for the kinds of dictionary-definition strict quota systems
that are permissible in India.75 In Europe, this is expressed under the
language of "fixed preference systems" or "inflexible quotas. 76 Also like
the United States, the ECJ's general stance is that fixed preferences and
absolute entitlements are also unlawful quotas, even if not quotas in the
dictionary sense.77 Interestingly, not only does India differ from the United
States/Europe in its stance on fixed quotas, but it also differs in the direction
in which the dialogue is moving. Whereas Europe and the United States
continuously attempt to invent a system which creates a preference for a
disadvantaged group member without creating a fixed quota for that member,
India has reversed the debate: In India, some form of fixed quota for
disadvantaged classes has existed since the 1947 Constitution,7 and even
74 Needham, supra note 43, at 495.
75 Brems, supra note 50, at 674 (noting that "fixed women's quotas" (starre Frauenquote in German) are
still prohibited under Community law (citing Dagmar Schiek, Positive Action in Community Law, 25
INDUSTRIAL L. J. 239, 241 (1996))). Amie Needham states that a "common theme delivered by both the
ECJ and the U.S. Supreme Court is that automatic quotas will not pass muster under either of the tests
enunciated." Needham, supra note 43, at 495. See also Abraharmsson v. Fogelqvist, E.C.I. 2000 Page 1-
05539 (July 6, 2000) (second question addressed by the Court). But see Brems, supra note 50, at 672
("The Court implicitly rejects the line of reasoning which excludes all systems of quotas and goals from
the definition of measures to promote equality of opportunity.").
76 Compare Kalanke, supra note 45 (holding that National measures guaranteeing women absolute and
unconditional priority for appointment or promotion are not consistent with Art. 2(4) of the Equal
Treatment Directive), with Marschall, supra note 44 (distinguishing Kalanke on the grounds that national
measure in the present case contained a "savings clause," so that the preferential system was not "absolute
and unconditional").
77 Albertine G. Veldman, Preferential Treatment in European Community Law: Current Legal
Developments and the impact on National Practices, in NON-DISCIRIMINATION LAW:
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 279, 288 (Titia Loenen & Peter R. Rodrigues eds., 1999) (arguing
that, like the United States Supreme Court, "the ECJ also requires that all are able to have their
qualifications weighted against those of other applicants"); Abrahamsson, supra note 75, Judgment at
56, 59, 62 (holding that a national law requiring an absolute preference for women is contrary to EC law,
but continuing to distinguish flexible preferences for women that include other objective criteria, which
are consistent with EC law). See also European Commission's proposed amendments to the Equal
Treatment Directive (June 7, 2000), available at
http://eiro.eurofound.ie/2000/06/Feature/EU0006255F.htm (restating case law of the ECJ as holding that
"automatic priority to women regarding access to employment or promotion in sectors where they are
under-represented cannot be justified").
" Prior, supra note 2, at 75-76 (describing reservations for members of Scheduled Castes or Scheduled
Tribes in state legislatures and the House of the People).
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before during British colonial rule.79 It was not until the Indra Sawhney
case, however, that the Supreme Court began discussing other less extreme
methods for favoring disadvantaged groups, including concessions,
exemptions, and other relaxations, ruling that such additional provisions
would fall within the broad scope of reservations. ° Thus, whereas Europe
and the United States begin with the less extreme options in order to avoid
the absolute quota, India began with the absolute quota, only recently
holding that less extreme measures would also be acceptable.
On the other hand, European flexibility on fixed quotas looks very
different than the United States (and more like India) in several ways. First,
the ECJ has shown some movement in terms of redefining what constitutes
an "inflexible" quota. For example, against the opinion of the Advocate
General, the Court upheld an ostensibly inflexible 50% quota for
appointments to administrative and supervisory bodies, holding that the
provision establishing the quota does not create an inflexible quota but rather
a non-mandatory goal, full implementation of which would still require
amendment to the relative law.8'
Second, the ECJ has also compromised its otherwise strict distaste
for quotas when the measure in question applies in areas prior or ancillary to
the hiring decision itself. For example, in Badeck, the Court upheld a fixed
quota on training positions, but emphasized that the "provision at issue in the
main proceedings forms part of a restricted concept of equality of
opportunity. It is not places in employment which are reserved for women
but places in training., 82 Similarly, the Badeck court held that a provision
guaranteeing that equally-qualified female candidates will receive an
interview in sectors where they are underrepresented is consistent with
Community law because it "does not attempt to achieve a final result
appointment or promotion. 83  Most recently, the Court in Lommers v.
Minister van Landbouw, Natuurbeheer en Visserij held that a national policy
reserving a fixed number of subsidized nursery spaces for children of female
employees, rebuttable only in the case of an emergency situation for a male,
79 Id. at 72-73 (describing reservations "in public service posts for Muslims, Christians, Anglo-Indians,
and other communal groups ... aimed at adjusting the political balance among different caste and
religious groups and improving the plight of the disadvantaged").
80 Indra Sawhney. supra note 23, at 540.
S1 Badeck, supra note 55, at 65. In addition, note generally the added flexibility the Court gives in the
case of measures containing a savings clause beginning with the Marschall ruling, discussed supra note
76.
82 Badeck, supra note 55, at 52-55.
" Id. 56-63.
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is consistent with Community law because the measure is of the type
"designed to limit the causes of women's reduced opportunities.
' '84
Third, there is a subtle difference between the European and
American approaches to absolute entitlements. Like the United States, an
absolute preference for a protected group in a tie-break scheme is unlawful in
Europe.8 5 But, unlike the United States, a tie can be broken in Europe by
membership in a protected group when protected group membership is the
last factor considered among many factors that otherwise leave two
candidates equal8 6 In this sense, the European notion of a "fatal quota" falls
somewhere in between the American notion and the Indian notion: While
the United States Supreme Court still mandates that gender can be only one
factor in the decision, the ECJ allows programs requiring the hiring of a
woman when all other factors are equal.8 7 Commentators are quick to point
out that, because of the savings clause, the Marschall standard is not an
"absolute entitlement" sensu stricto.88 Nevertheless, the Marschall ruling
goes farther than the United States Supreme court was willing to go in
Johnson. If two candidates are equally qualified with all savings clause
considerations taken in to account,8 9 it is acceptable in Europe for a person's
gender alone to tip the scales,90 whereas the United States Supreme Court
emphasizes that sex can be only one factor in the hiring decision.9'
Therefore, while neither plan provides an absolute entitlement, European law
comes closer than United States law.
84 Lommers, supra note 57, at 32-33, 38, 50 (2002) (citing the training ruling in Badeck).
s5 Abrahamsson, supra note 75 (first question addressed by the Court).
86 Needham, supra note 43, at 495.
87 Id. at 495; Mertus, supra note 50, at 300 (ruling that "positive action will not be appropriate when the
male candidate is more qualified than the female candidate"); Abrahamsson. supra note 75 (rejecting an
absolute preference for a female candidate who is qualified but lacks qualifications equal to those of a
male candidate).
8s See Brems, supra note 50, at 673 (noting that the "Court maintains its position that such measures
cannot guarantee absolute and unconditional priority for women").
89 Cox argues that taking the "savings clause into account may not even be that difficult. She maintains
that "[c]omparatively speaking, the saving clause does render the preferential scheme more flexible....
[A]lthough at some point a preference can still be thought to "kick in," its operation cannot be regarded as
a foregone conclusion." Cox, supra note 45, at 137-38. In other words, the basic rule, according to Cox,
is one in which preference is awarded based on gender. The savings clause, although providing the
technical difference to distinguish Marschall from Kalanke, does not change this, and operates only
occasionally.
90 Advocate General Jacob's opinion in Marschall, which was rejected by the Court, clarifies this notion.
He argues that "[ilt is axiomatic that there is no equal opportunity for men and women in an individual
case if, where all else is equal, one is appointed or promoted in preference to the other solely by virtue of
his or her sex." Marschall, supra note 44, at 32 (opinion of Advocate General Jacobs). Jacobs'
reasoning parallel's the United States Supreme Court's analysis of the second prong of the Johnson,
supra note 39, at 637-39. By rejecting that reasoning, the ECJ allows for cases in which sex does become
the final determinative factor.
9' Needham, supra note 43, at 495.
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Examining this very subtle difference between the American and
European approaches exposes a weak element in the American logic: In
cases where the disadvantaged group factor was in fact the decisive factor,92
why does it matter that it was one of many factors? The United States focus
on the aggregate of factors tipping the scale ignores the fact that, in some
cases, it will indeed be this specific factor that makes the aggregate of factors
tip the scales.93 In this way, the United States "aggregate tips the scales"
requirement is very slippery, and only clouds good legal reasoning: It is
illogical that a jurisdiction that accepts affirmative action would not accept
that, sometimes, this affirmative action will operate. It would appear that
United States law seeks a standard by which disadvantage can "tip the
scales" as long as it does so ambiguously enough so that one cannot prove
decisively that a seat was awarded based on disadvantage. In the words of
Justice Brennan in Bakke, "there is no basis for preferring a particular
preference program simply because in achieving the same goals [as a quota
system], it proceeds in a manner that is not immediately apparent to the
public. ' 94 I am not trying to argue against affirmative action in the United
States, which I support; rather, I wish only to point out that the European
standard, by which disadvantage alone can "tip the scales" as long as it is one
of many factors, is more workable, and more honest, than the United States
"let the aggregate tip the scales" standard, since, within the United States
standard lies the European standard: regardless of whether the aggregate is
tipping the scales, at times it is the specific factor of disadvantage which is
causing that aggregate to do so. If a jurisdiction is going to practice
affirmative action, it cannot and should not deny that, in some cases,
affirmative action will "tip the scales," no matter how controversial this may
be.
95
92 Admittedly, a lot turns on whether one can ever state with confidence that protected group status was
the decisive factor in the United States. See my discussion of the "causation fallacy" infra Part IIIB.
Also, see the debate between Judge Boggs and Judge Clay in Grutter. Compare Grutter v. Bollinger, 288
F.3d 732, 796-801 (6th Cir. 2002) (Judge Boggs frames the facts in such a way that it appears Barbara
Grutter had absolutely no chance of acceptance, whereas a black woman of equal qualifications would
have an almost 100% chance of success), with id. at 766-69 (Judge Clay frames the facts in an equally
convincing way in which it appears that a borderline applicant has almost no chance of admission
regardless of the affirmative action plan).
93 This is, indeed, the focus of endless anti-affirmative action court opinions. See, e.g., Grutter v.
Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732, 800-03 (6th Cir. 2002) (arguing that there is no functional difference between
"tipping the scales" and a strict quota).
94 Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 397 (1978), cited in Grutter, 288 F.3d
at 802.
95 The United States refusal to recognize that affirmative action can in fact tip the scales so as to
redistribute social wealth more equitably is also evident in the strong United States reliance on the
diversity rationale, discussed infra part IV.
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B. Number of People Affected
The reservations policy in India unquestionably affects many more
applicants than affirmative action in the United States. As explained supra
section A, the Indian Supreme Court held that reservations for backwards
classes cannot exceed 50% of available seats, 96 and the 1979 Mandal
Commission report followed this limit by recommending combined
reservations totaling 49.5%,97 which were upheld by the court.98 The seats
ultimately awarded to minority applicants based on affirmative action in the
United States are far fewer. In Bakke, 16% of the seats were reserved for
"economically and/or educationally disadvantaged applicants." 99 In Grutter,
the "critical mass" sought by the law school was sometimes as small as 10%,
and never exceeded 20.1% between 1987 and 1998.'°°
One interesting result of the application of affirmative action to such
diametrically opposite numerical patterns is the complete reversal of the
"causation fallacy," a concept recently coined by Goodwin Liu.'
According to the "causation fallacy," it is fallacious for a denied white
applicant such as Bakke to blame affirmative action: although affirmative
action programs often increase minority applicants chances of admission
significantly, they only decrease a non-disadvantaged applicant's chances of
admission in a very minimal way, often less than one percent. 10 2  For
example, Bakke was one of 3109 non-disadvantaged applicants to the
University of California Davis Medical School. With 16 reserved seats, non-
96 Balaji, supra note 62 (holding that the total percentage of reservations permissible under Article 15(4)
of the Indian Constitution generally should be less than 50%); Devadasan, supra note 62 (holding that
unused reservations of a previous year can not be carried forward and added to the reservations in a
subsequent year if the total number of reservations available in the subsequent year then exceeds 50%).
97 REPORT OF THE MANDAL COMMISSION, summarized in Prior, supra note 2, at 84-85. This
included a new 27% reservation of government positions for Other Backward Classes, in addition to the
previously existing quota reserving 22.5% of government positions for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled
Tribes. Id.
98 Indra Sawhney, supra note 23, at I 94A; Rajkumar v. Gulbarga Univ., 77 A.I.R. (Kant.) 320, 332
(1990) (also following the 50% limit established in Balaji).
9 Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 274-75 (1978).
100 Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732, 747-48 (6th Cir. 2002).
'o' Goodwin Liu, The Causation Fallacy: Bakke and the Basic Arithmetic of Selective Admissions, 100
MICH. L. REV. 1045 (2002); Uu, The Myth & Math of Affinnative Action, WASH. POST, April 14,
2002, at BOI.
102 Liu, The Myth & Math of Affirmative Action, supra note 101. Liu argues that by focusing on the
minority applicant's improved chances instead of one's own diminished chances, normal applicants place
too much blame in affirmative action for their own rejection. But see Liu, The Causation Fallacy: Bakke
and the Basic Arithmetic of Selective Admissions, supra note 101, at 1049-50 (arguing also that "absent
the causation fallacy, white applicants have legitimate grounds for claiming that affirmative action
prevents them from competing on an equal footing with minority applicants").
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disadvantaged applicants chance of admission was 2.7% (84 divided by
3109). Without the affirmative action program, any non-disadvantaged
applicant would have a chance of admission of 3.2% (100 divided by 3109),
an increase of only half a percent. 10 3  By focusing on the comparatively
larger improved percentage chance of admission for disadvantaged
applicants instead of this miniscule diminished chance of admission for non-
disadvantaged applicants, opponents of affirmative action commit the
causation fallacy. This reality is the mathematical result of an affirmative
action program that only benefits a small minority of applicants.'
4
The situation in India is different in two critical ways: First, the
affirmative action program reserves half the seats, instead of a small
minority.0 5 Second, the disadvantaged group represents a majority (74.5%)
of the population instead of a minority. 10 6  Consequently, the causation
fallacy is flipped on its head: Whereas in the United States, Liu showed that
the denied white applicant, after accepting the causation fallacy, is
statistically hardly denied any of his/her chance of admission (since s/he is a
small fish in a big pond irrespective of the affirmative action program), in
India the advantaged applicant is denied a statistically large chance of
admission, since the reservations make 50% of the seats inaccessible to that
applicant, who belongs to a group comprising only 25.5%107 of the
population. 1 8 Thus, the Indian reality is the United States fallacy: If the
United States majority white applicant were only to go to India and become
an Indian advantaged applicant, his/her argument would cease to be
fallacious. In this way, the difference between the United States situation
and the Indian situation aptly illustrates the "causation fallacy," and in turn
the "causation fallacy," which is fallacious in one jurisdiction and not in the
other, helps to illustrate just how different the two jurisdictions are.
Whereas in most other areas, I argue that the European case falls
between the United States and Indian models, but still generally closer to the
United States, this is one case where Europe may more closely replicate
India. Just as 50% of seats in India may be reserved for backwards classes,
103 Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732, 767-68 (6th Cir. 2002) (Clay, J., concurring).
" Id. at 767-68 (Clay, J., concurring) ("Because the number of black applicants to selective institutions is
relatively small, admitting them a [sic] higher rates does not significantly lower the chance of admission
for the average individual in the relatively large sea of white applicants.") (citing Liu, The Myth & Math
of Affirmative Action, supra note 101 ).
'0' REPORT OF THE MANDAL COMMISSION, supra note 63 (reserving 49.5% of the seats for
backward classes, scheduled castes, and scheduled tribes).
'06 Prior, supra note 2, at 84.
107 id.
"' However, this would not hold true in the case that, despite being a minority in the society, regular
applicants are nevertheless a majority of applicants.
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scheduled castes, and scheduled tribes,'0 9 the ECJ has also approved national
legislation under which, "whenever there are fewer women than men '[I]n a
pay, remuneration or salary bracket in a career group,' the authorities must
adopt an advancement plan."' 10 This plan is valid for two years, after which
time every further appointment or promotion of a male candidate would
undergo strict review if the 50% quota had not been met, leading Advocate
General Saggio to note that "[d]espite the temporary nature of the
advancement plan, it is therefore clear that the requirement to give priority to
women does not lapse after two years but only when women represent 50%
of the employees in every sector and grade in a career group."' Similarly,
the plan upheld by the Badeck court also mandated that at least half of the
training places 1 2 and appointments to administrative and supervisory
bodies 13 be awarded to women. It is even theoretically possible, under the
legislation upheld in Badeck, that certain of these flexible quotas could go
beyond 50%, thus surpassing India. For example, the legislation upheld by
the Court prescribed binding targets for temporary and assistant academic
service positions that are "at least equal to the percentage of women among
graduates, holders of higher degrees, and students in each discipline."
Although unlikely, it is theoretically possible that this number could exceed
50%, as the case of United States law schools shows, in which female law
students now outnumber males."'
Thus, whereas affirmative action programs in the United States
benefit a small number of people, almost always less than 20%, up to 50% of
seats can be set aside under Indian reservation policy. While I generally
portray the European case as falling between the United States and India, this
represents one area in which Europe is much more closely aligned with
India, and may even exceed Indian limits in certain restricted cases.
IV. RATIONALE
Another difference between affirmative action in the United States
on the one hand and Europe/India on the other is the rationale behind that
affirmative action. In both Europe and India, the common rationale for
"o Indra Sawhney, supra note 23, at 94A.
110 Badeck, supra note 55, at 34 (A-G's opinion), T 38 (Court's opinion).
... Id. 34 (A-G's opinion).
112 Id. 1 55 (Court's opinion).
113 Id. 1 66 (Court's opinion).
14 Id. 44 (Court's opinion).
.. DIVERSIFIED COMMUNICATIONS GROUP, INC., LAW SCHOOL ENROLLMENT SHOWS WOMEN
LEADING (2002), available at http://www.idcg.net/quicknotes.shtml.
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affirmative action is remedying societal discrimination. The European
Commission has stated that "[t]he concept of positive action embraces all
measures which aim to counter the effects of past discrimination, to
eliminate existing discrimination and to promote equality of opportunity
between women and men, particularly in relation to types or levels of jobs
where members of one sex are significantly under-represented. '"1 6  The
remedial rationale behind affirmative action in Europe is also evident in the
provision of the Equal Treatment Directive on which affirmative action is
based: "This Directive shall be without prejudice to measures to promote
equal opportunity for men and women, in particular by removing existing
inequalities which affect women's opportunities in the areas referred to in
Article 1(1). ' ' 1  Thus, affirmative action programs attempt to remedy
existing or past discrimination which prevents women from attaining the
level of equality espoused in the rest of the Directive.
India's reservation policy is also based on a remedial rationale. 1 8
United States Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg characterized the
remedial rationale in India, stating that "[flew citizens of India deny either a
long history of overt discrimination against disfavored castes or the
persistence of deep-seated bias against those groups. Perhaps that public
recognition explains, in part, why 'reservations' beyond any set-asides
tolerable in the United States have survived in India."" 9 Professor Marc
Galanter, a specialist on the Indian legal system, has also noted that
"historical restitution or reparation to offset the systematic and cumulative
deprivations suffered by lower castes in the past ... are the basis for which
the policy of 'compensatory discrimination' and its implementation exist.
' 2
The United States rationale, on the other hand, differs from Europe
and India in two respects. First, whereas general discrimination (as opposed
to specific institutional discrimination) is an acceptable rationale in the
European 12' and Indian12 2 context, it is generally not considered acceptable in
"6 Commission of the European Communities, Communication by the Commission to the Council and the
European Parliament on the Interpretation of the Judgment of the European Court of Justice on 17
October 1995 in Case C-450193, Kalanke v. Freie Hansestadt Bremen, COM (96) 88, cited in Cox, supra
note 45, at 105.
17 Equal Treatment Directive, supra note 12, at Art. 2(4) (emphasis added).
"S Prior, supra note 2, at 65-66 ("India's affirmative action program, referred to as compensatory
discrimination by most scholars, is a daring attempt to remedy past injustices suffered by those who are at
the lower levels of India's four-tier caste hierarchy.") (emphasis added).
119 Ruth Bader Ginsburg & Deborah Jones Merritt, Fifty First Cardozo Memorial Lecture-Affirmative
Action: An International Human Rights Dialogue, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 253, 276 (1999).
"i0 MARC GALANTER, COMPETING EQUALITIES: LAW AND THE BACKWARD CLASSES IN
INDIA 1 (1984).
121 Cox, supra note 45, at 106.
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the United States.123 Second, the United States debate on affirmative action
in educational admissions provides an additional rationale not advanced in
Europe, India, ' 24 or in other United States contexts: 125 the diversity rationale.
In fact, the Grutter majority devotes its entire argument to the diversity
rationale, noting that "[b]ecause we hold that the Law School has a
compelling interest in achieving a diverse student body, we do not address
whether the Intervenors' proffered interest-an interest in remedying past
discrimination-is sufficiently compelling for equal protection purposes.'
2 6
The District Court, on the other hand, attempts (like the circuit court dissent)
to narrow the holding of Bakke to its original facts specifically in an attempt
to kill the diversity rationale by arguing that intervening Supreme Court
precedent provides only a remedial basis for affirmative action.'27 Even the
Circuit Court dissent, which refuses to accept the District Court's logic
despite its yielding what it views as a correct result, 2 ' still frames the debate
122 Jackson, supra note 18, at 262 ("Thomas and Indra Sawhney, to the contrary, sustain affirmative action
even when the discrimination may have been entirely outside the domain of the current practice or
policy.").
123 Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co.. 488 U.S. 469,498 (1989), (rejecting any racial classifications based on
remediation of general past discrimination, as opposed to specific institutional discrimination); Wygant v.
Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 276 (1986) (rejecting the societal discrimination justification for a
race-conscious lay-off policy, holding that under the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, "societal discrimination, without more, is too amorphous a basis for imposing a racially
classified remedy" ); United States v. Paradise. 480 U.S. 149 (1987) (upholding race-based hiring or
promotion programs when necessary to correct a racial imbalance caused by documented racial
discrimination by a particular agency or employer); Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732, 809 (6th Cir.
2002) (rejecting all affirmative action based on general "societal ills," citing Richmond); Grutter v.
Bollinger, 137 F. Supp. 2d 821, 847-49 (6th Cir. 2002) (Boggs, J., dissenting) (arguing that the only
compelling interest recognized by the Supreme Court for affirmative action is remedying specific
instances of discrimination; see also Grutter 288 F.3d at 739 (Boggs, J., dissenting) (reformulating the
district court in these distinct terms); Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, (1976). See also
Ginsburg & Merritt, supra note 119, at 267 ("State and local attempts to remedy "societal discrimination"
have not survived Court scrutiny, despite empirical evidence documenting persistent racial discrimination
in education, employment, housing, and consumer transactions."); but see id. at 271 (noting that the
United States Supreme Court in Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977), "endorsed a societal
discrimination rationale resembling the remedial justification it was not willing to embrace, the next year,
in the more divisive setting of race and medical school admissions").
124 1 cannot say with confidence that the diversity rationale is never advanced in the two jurisdictions. I
can say that it is not a major rationale in any of the main cases, and certainly is never the focus of the
debate to the extent it is in the higher education context in the United States.
125 Hopwood v. State of Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 965 n.21 (5th Cir. 1996) (Wiener, J., concurring) ("This
unique context, first identified by Justice Powell, differs from the employment context, differs from the
minority business set aside context, and differs from the re-districting context; it comprises only the public
education context and implicates the uneasy marriage of the First and Fourteenth Amendments."). See
also Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732, 749 (6th Cir. 2002) (arguing that consideration of race in
educational admissions "differs materially from the government contracting context) (citing Hopwood).
i26 Grutter, 288 F.3d at 739 n.4.
27 Grutter v. Bollinger, 137 F. Supp. 2d 821, 849 (E.D. Mich. 2001) (citing Adarand Constructors v.
Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995); Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469,493 (1989)).
"2' Grutter, 288 F.3d at 788 (Boggs, J., dissenting) ("While I find persuasive the district court's attempt to
derive from the Supreme Court's Adarand and Croson decisions a holding that diversity is not a
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entirely in terms of diversity in its Bakke-free reconsideration of the facts "on
the merits.0 29 Thus, while affirmative action cannot be based on a general
remedial rationale in the United States, the affirmative action question is
largely kept alive by the debate over the diversity rationale.130 This debate is
markedly different from Europe and India, which do accept that affirmative
action is at least partly based on the need to correct for general past
discrimination or present stereotyping.
V. CREAMY LAYER
In a monstrous 300 page opinion, the Indian Supreme Court in Indra
Sawhney upheld the Mandal Commission report, recommending a 27%
reservation for Other Backwards Classes (those who are still subordinated
even if ranked hierarchically above the scheduled castes and tribes).' Key
to the Court's argument was the elaboration of the "creamy layer" test, which
creates a number of disqualifiers for Backwards Class status. In addition to
the imposition of an income limit, 132 the test "addresses intergenerational
transmission of status by disallowing children whose parents have achieved
high-ranking positions in the government or military from claiming reserved
positions, . .. prescribes income criteria for people engaged in professional
employment and trade/commerce, develops various calculations of wealth
derived from agricultural landholdings.' 33 In general, the test operates so as
to eliminate those who, although members of a backwards class, live a social
and economic reality which distinguishes them from members of that class.
In this section, I examine affirmative action in the United States and Europe
through the lens of India's creamy layer concept. I conclude that Europe has
permissible rationale, it would be somewhat disingenuous of me to fault the majority of this court for
divining a firm and binding holding from Bakke while urging the court to do the same from Adarand and
Croson.").
29 Id. at 788-808.
130 Although the diversity debate is alive, it is far from decided. The circuit split on this issue, enveloping
at least five of the circuits, provides a major justification for Certiorari by the Supreme Court. Compare
Smith v. University of Wash. Law Sch., 233 F.3d 1188, 1200-1201 (9th Cir. 2000) (arguing that diversity
is a compelling state interest for affirmative action); Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732 (6th Cir. 2002)
(upholding Michigan's affirmative action plan based on a diversity rationale); with Hopwood v. State of
Texas 78 F.2d 944-45 (5th Cir. 1996) (arguing that diversity is not a compelling state interest for
affirmative action). Still other circuits decline to decide the issue. See Eisenberg v. Montgomery County
Pub. Sch., 197 F.3d 123, 130 (4th Cir. 1999) (arguing that "whether diversity is a compelling
governmental interest remains unresolved, and in this case, we also choose to leave it unresolved");
Wessmann v. Gittens. 160 F.3d 790, 796 (1 st Cir. 1998) (stating that "we need not definitively resolve this
conundrum today").
131 Sridharan, supra note 21, at 114-16.
132 Id. at 116 (citing Indra Sawhney, supra note 23).
133 id.
[Vol. 9:73
From Hutchins Hall to Hyderabad
been more willing than the United States to accept a rationale similar to the
Indian "creamy layer" argument.
The European approach adopts a mechanism that is very much like
the Indian "creamy layer" in the savings clause, the critical difference that
distinguishes Marschall from Kalanke. Both the "creamy layer" test and the
savings clause aim at doing the same thing: addressing those people who
defy the line drawn by the affirmative action test adopted. In the case of the
''creamy layer," the people defying the line are elite/rich disadvantaged class
members who would normally benefit from reservations, creating an unfair
situation in the eyes of the Court. The "creamy layer" test operates to restore
fairness to the system, denying the benefits of the reservation policy to those
who are disadvantaged in name only. In the case of the savings clause, the
people defying the line are atypical men, who although disadvantaged in
some unique way, would not benefit from affirmative action, creating an
equally unfair situation in the eyes of that court. Acting in the opposite
direction, the savings clause test also operates to restore fairness to the
system, providing those who are not disadvantaged in name but are
disadvantaged in substance with the benefits of affirmative action.
Similarly, in Lommers, the Court's reservation of spaces in
subsidized nursing facilities for the children of female employees is subject
to the caveat that it applies "only in so far, in particular, as the said exception
in favour of male officials is construed as allowing those of them who take
care of their children by themselves to have access to that nursery places
[sic] on the same conditions as female officials.' 34  This is interesting
because interruption to career due to household and family duties is one of
the very factors that the ECJ had previously determined to make women
disadvantaged. 35 The caveat in the Lommers case thus assures that those
who are, for the purposes of the ECJ test, men in name but women in
substance, are not unfairly treated like men and denied the benefits of
affirmative action. Like the savings clause and the "creamy layer" test, it is
designed to account for exceptions to the rule, so as to create a fairer test.
In this way, the importance of the savings clause in Marschall and
the caveat in Lommers both operate like "creamy layer" in reverse: instead
of creating an exception for the cream of the underprivileged group, the
European exceptions create one for the oil 36 of the privileged group.
134 Lommers, supra note 57, at J 50.
135 Marschall, supra note 44, at 29.
13 Drawing a new metaphor from an oil and water mixture, in which the oil goes to the bottom. In this
sense, the European approach is similar to the additional 10% set aside proposed by Prime Minister P.V.
Narasimha Rao's Congress party for individuals who are poor despite being from an upper caste or no
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Regardless of the reverse operation of the exceptions in the two jurisdictions,
it remains true that exceptions are nevertheless created in both cases, and the
rationale is the same in each: to fine-tune the test so as to improve its
fairness.
In the United States, a "creamy layer" argument is forwarded, but
rejected, by the Dissent in Grutter.'3 7 The Dissent argued that "[a]n African-
American who comes to the Law School by way of Choate and Harvard may
well have quite a different experience of discrimination than one from a rural
public school."' 38 Similarly, the Dissent argues that "[n]ext door neighbors
in Grosse Pointe [an affluent Detroit suburb], separated only by 30 yards and
the color of their skin, would not necessarily be significantly different from
each other."' 39  In effect, by arguing against Michigan's plan because a
minority from elite or affluent backgrounds could benefit from it, the Dissent
is bringing the "creamy layer" argument to Michigan. Judge Clay,
concurring with the majority, rejects this attempt, arguing that membership
in an elite class should not trump race: "[I]t is naYve to believe that because
an African American lives in an affluent neighborhood, he or she has not
known or been the victim of discrimination such that he or she cannot relate
the same life experiences as the impoverished black person.' 140  Thus, the
creamy layer argument has been rejected by the majority on its practical
merits.
Clearly, because the diversity rationale is before the court in
Grutter,14' both Judge Boggs (supporting the "creamy layer" rationale) and
Judge Clay (refuting it), couch their arguments firmly in the language of
diversity. 142  This may lead the astute reader to distinguish them from the
Indian and European "creamy layer" in their ends: Whereas the "creamy
caste at all (non-Hindu). Prior, supra note 2, at 69. The 10% Indian set-aside, however, was struck down
by the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney, supra note 23, at 578.
137 All references to Grutter are to the Circuit Court decision unless otherwise indicated.
138 Grutter v. Bollinger. 288 F.3d 732, 791 (6th Cir. 2002) (footnotes omitted) (Boggs, J., dissenting).
139 Id. at 807 (Boggs, J., dissenting).
140 Id. at 764-65 (Clay, J. concurring). See also Deborah C. Malamud, Affirmative Action: Diversity of
Opinions: Affirmative Action, Diversity, and the Black Middle Class, 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 939 (1997)
(arguing that race-based economic inequality is not limited solely to the poor, but effects all classes).
141 See my discussion of the diversity rationale supra section V.
142 For the "creamy layer," Judge Boggs argues that "it is not at all clear how true diversity is served by
giving massive preference to a student whose parents or grandparents came from an upper-class suburb or
Buenos Aires, over those whose grandparents immigrated from similar areas of Paris, Munich, or Tokyo.
Grutter, 288 F.3d at 791 (Boggs, J., dissenting). Against creamy layer, Judge Clay argues
"[n]otwithstanding the fact that the black applicant may be similarly situated financially to the affluent
white candidates, this black applicant may very well bring to the student body life experiences rich in the
African-American traditions emulating the struggle the black race has endure in order for the black
applicant even to have the opportunities and privileges to learn." Id. at 764 (Clay, J., concurring). See
also id. at 766 ('[C]ontrary to the dissent's assertion, a minority member of wealthy means may bring to
the educational environment the same 'life experiences' that a minority member of impoverished means
may bring because the 'societal ills' experienced by both transcend economic status.").
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layer" argument is based on moral desert in both India (the applicant does
not "deserve" the seat because s/he is not truly disadvantaged) and Europe
(that applicant does deserve the seat because he is truly disadvantaged),
Judge Clay's argument is diversity-based (the applicant should not get the
seat because his/her elite/rich status would trump race in an attempt to create
diversity). But, regardless of the different ends (diversity in the United
States context, remedying past or present discrimination in India or Europe),
the fact remains that the acceptable means vary between the United States on
the one hand and India/Europe on the other. Whereas India invented creamy
layer, and Europe is replicating it in a unique way, it is rejected in the
Grutter case.1
43
VI. THE QUESTION OF CULTURAL RELATIVISM
I have spent the past pages categorizing differences. Whether the
line is drawn between India and Europe/USA or between India/Europe and
United States, it is safe to conclude that the differences are numerous.
Affirmative action is a controversial human rights issue, and in the various
ways discussed it is handled differently by the three different jurisdictions.
This lands United States squarely in the debate over the cultural relativism of
human rights. In this final section, I will address this issue, arguing that the
various differences I have exposed between jurisdictions do not bolster the
case for cultural relativism. In fact, in several respects affirmative action as
portrayed in these three jurisdictions supports the notion that human rights
are universal.
In questioning the universality of human rights, the first point to be
made is that, although the cultures and political climates of India, Europe,
and the United States differ significantly, the very fact that affirmative
actions exists in all three jurisdictions offers proof that human rights are
universal. Cultural relativism is most convincing in cases where a right in
one jurisdiction appears completely inapplicable in another jurisdiction. The
most common example of this is the potential conflict between human rights
standards upholding equality of the sexes 44 and Islamic personal status laws,
143 In this subsection, I have compared the United States and Europe employing the language/model of
India. At least one commentator has directly addressed the absence of the European "savings clause" in
United States gender affirmative action policy. Needham, supra note 43, at 497 (arguing that by
"allowing for a "savings clause" type of rule, the United States Supreme Court could make even greater
progress toward leveling the playing field for women in the United States").
144 See, e.g.. Convention on the Elimination ofAll Forms of Discrimination Against Women, arts. 1-16,
Dec. 18, 1979 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1981) 1249 U.N.T.S. 13. (1981) ("States Parties ... agree to...
embody the principle of the equality of men and women in their national constitutions or other appropriate
legislation if not yet incorporated therein and to ensure, through law and other appropriate means, the
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which appear in some cases to disregard Western notions of gender
equality. 45 But, even in this case, commentators are highly divided on the
cultural relativist question. 46 In the case of affirmative action, however, this
"right" to promote disadvantaged groups has been recognized in some form
in all three of the jurisdictions examined.
Furthermore, all three jurisdictions often struggle with similar issues
within their respective affirmative action debates. To provide only one such
example, all the jurisdictions continue to debate the ability of membership in
an identifiable group to serve as a proxy for a broader concept, be it
economic disadvantage or diversity. For example, in the United States, a
racial classification can only survive strict scrutiny if there is no "race
neutral" means to meet the compelling state interest. 147 While the search for
an alternative "experiential diversity" permeates Judge Boggs's dissent in
Grutter,148 this approach was rejected by the majority, arguing that "as the
dissent essentially acknowledges, this proposed alternative could not
possibly achieve the same robust academic diversity currently sought and
obtained by the Law School.' 49  In India, also, debates abound whether
practical realization of this principle."); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 3, Dec.
19 1966 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) 999 U.N.T.S. 171(1976) ("The States Parties to the present
Covenant undertake to ensure the equal right of men and women.").
145 See, e.g., Human Rights Committee: Third Periodic Report of Yemen, 141, UN Doc.;
CCPR/C/YEM/2001/3 (Oct. 18, 2001) ("A husband has a right to his wife's obedience in matters
affecting the family's interests, particularly with regard to the following: She must... permit him to live
with her and enjoy access to her,... permit him to have licit intercourse with her, ... obey his orders
without obstinacy and perform her work in the conjugal home .... not leave the conjugal home without
his permission.").
146 See, e.g., Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im, The Rights of Women and International Law in the Muslim
Context, 9 WHITTIER L. REV. 491 (1987); Ann Elizabeth Mayer, Universal Verses Islamic Human
Rights: A Clash of Cultures or a Clash With a Construct? 15 MICH. J. INT'L L. 307 (1994) (arguing a
universalist line that Islam is compatible with international human rights norms, partly because personal
status laws represent a more complex system of rights and obligations which nevertheless leaves the sexes
equal); Compare Is Islam Compatible With Democracy and Human Rights, INST. FOR THE
SECULARIZATION OF ISLAMIC SOC., available at
http://www.secularislam.org/humanrights/compatible.htm (directly refuting Mayer's contentions and
arguing that Islam can never be consistent with intemational human rights norms).
14' Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 507 (1989); United States v. Paradise. 480 U.S. 149, 171
(1987); Associated Gen. Contractors of Ohio, Inc. v. Drabik, 214 F.3d 730, 736 (6th Cir. 2000).
1" Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732, 792 (6th Cir. 2002) (arguing that "a system.., seeking experiential
diversity would be unlikely to raise significant constitutional problems,... [and t]he law school cannot
plausibly maintain that the system would be impractical, especially because, as they elsewhere remind
United States for purposes of distinguishing its preference from a quota, only one admissions officer reads
all applications, makes all decisions, and therefore is capable of considering candidates individually. The
possibility of an experientially based admissions system and the Law School's apparent disinterest in such
a system, indicate that the Law School grants preference to race, not as a proxy for a unique set of
experiences, but as a proxyfor race itself') (emphasis in original).
149 Id. at 750 (reasoning that "by reducing the range of experiences the Law School can consider-namely,
the experience of being an African American, Hispanic or native American in a society where race
matters-the dissent proposes only a narrowed and inferior version of the'academic diversity currently
sought by the Law School"). But see Jacques Steinberg, Using Synonyms for Race, College Strives For
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caste can be a proxy for backwardness. 50 Similarly, in Europe, the legality
of affirmative action plans in Marschall and Lommers hinges on a savings
clause which attempts to correct for individual cases in which gender is not
an effective proxy for disadvantage.'5 ' Moreover, in all three jurisdictions,
the use of such a proxy is highly debated but ultimately accepted in some
form.
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I have attempted in this paper to show that the United States has the
most restrictive program of the three jurisdictions; it represents the inner
circle of three concentric circles of affirmative action. Yet, the very presence
of affirmative action in the United States is strong proof of the universal
nature of human rights. Human rights can be conceptualized in several
ways. The most common divide is between civil and political rights and
economic, social, and cultural rights. 53  Commentators also distinguish
negative rights (which impose a hands-off duty of non-interference upon the
state, such as freedom from torture),' 54 and positive rights (which impose
Diversity, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 2002 (describing new policies at Rice University adopted in response to
the Hopwood decision, which aim to consider experiential instead of racial diversity).
150 See Indra Sawhney, supra note 23, at 61-66 (discussing the variety of commentators both for and
against the use of caste as a proxy for level of disadvantage). The Court reasoned that the Constitution did
not use the word "caste" not because it was not an accurate proxy for disadvantage, but rather because it
did not apply to all religions in India. Thus, the Court held that even though the word caste is not
specifically written in Article 16(4), it may still be used as a criterion for determining backwardness. Id. I
88A ("Since caste represents an existing, identifiable social group/class encompassing an overwhelming
majority of the country's population, one can well begin with it and then go to other groups, sections and
classes."). Inasmuch as Balaji and Devadasan can be applied to article 16(4), the Court overruled them as
to the appropriateness of using caste as a proxy for disadvantaged class. Prior, supra note 2, at 91-92
(noting that "[t]he Court emphatically stated that it was neither encouraging nor advocating the legitimacy
of caste distinction"). See also V. Narayana Rao v. A.P., 74 A.I.R. (A.P.) 53 (1987) (stating that too much
reliance on caste in identifying the "backward" is undesirable); B. Sivaramayya, Protective
Discrimination and Ethnic Mobilization, 22 J. INDIAN L. INST. 480,495 (1980) (arguing that
reservations should not be set solely on the basis of caste, but rather based on multiple factors such as
income, actual occupation, level of literacy, etc.).
151 See discussion and references supra Part V.
152 See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (subjecting gender-based classifications to
intermediate scrutiny); Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 235 (1995) (requiring strict scrutiny
for any race-based classifications imposed by government actor); Mertus, supra note 50, at 296
(describing the Marschall case in similar language as determining that "a narrowly tailored positive action
program for women is permissible under the. .. Equal Treatment Directive"); T.C.A. Sangeetha,
Women's Bill-Judgment Reserved, BUSINESS LINE (Aug. 3, 1998) (describing the Indian "Doctrine of
Reasonable Classification," which determines a reasonable classification by a two part standard: I) it
must be founded on an intelligible differentiation which distinguishes persons or things that are grouped
together from others left out of the group; and 2) it must have a rational relation to the object sought to
be achieved by the law in question).
53 For a description of this divide and the resultant drafting of two separate human rights Covenants to
account for it, see Comment on Historical Origins of Economic and Social Rights, in INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT: LAW, POLITICS, MORALS 242,244-45 (Henry J. Steiner & Philip
Alston eds., 2000).
154 Comment on Types of State Duties Imposed by Human Rights Treaties, in INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT: LAW, POLITICS, MORALS 180, 181 (Henry J. Steiner& Philip
Alston eds., 2000). This distinction has been somewhat eliminated, as commentators have subsequently
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positive duties upon the state, as is the case with most economic and social
rights). Still others attempt to combine both of these distinctions, and more,
by speaking of "generations" of human rights: First generation rights
concern individuals and are generally relegated to civil and political negative
rights; second generation rights, such as economic, social, and cultural rights,
are generally positive rights, and bridge the gap between individual rights
and group rights; third generation rights are collective group rights such as
the right to self-determination and the rights to development.' 55  In the
United States, the vast majority of accepted human rights are negative, first
generation civil and political rights of individuals. 56  For example, the
United States has not ratified the International Covenant on Economic,
Social, and Cultural Rights. 157  Nevertheless, affirmative action works to
protect economic, social and cultural rights such as the right to work'58 and
the right to education. 59 Furthermore, as a human right, affirmative action
accomplishes this protection in the form of a positive duty on a government
and it protects group rights. 60  Rather than viewing the varying approaches
to affirmative action as challenging the universality of human rights, one
should view the very existence of affirmative action in the United States as
strongly supporting the universality of human rights: it is evidence of a
second generation, positive state duty to promote economic, social, and
argued that any ostensibly "negative" right involves positive duties upon the state. For example,
protecting the negative right not to be tortured creates positive rights on the state to create and maintain a
court system, and train and educate law enforcement officers. See STEPHEN HOLEMES & CASS R.
SUNSTEIN, THE COST OF RIGHTS: WHY LIBERTY DEPENDS ON TAXES 1 (1999) (arguing that
"[a]ll rights are positive rights").
155 See Louis B. Sohn, The New International Law: Protection of the Rights of Individuals Rather Than
States. 32 AM. U.L. REV. 1, 32-62 (1982)
116 See DAVID J. BEDERMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW FRAMEWORKS 97 (2001) (arguing that
"some ... nations, particularly the United States, [are] wary of the 'second generation' economic, social
and cultural rights ... [because iun the constitutional culture of the United States, the prevailing attitude
was (and still is) that the purpose of rights is to insulate and protect people from government power. The
only right that makes sense is one that places restrictions on government action against individuals"). Of
the six primary human rights treaties, the three ratified by the United States all deal almost exclusively
with first-generation, civil and political rights. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
Dec. 19 1966 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976)999 U.N.T.S. 171; Convention Against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, art. 1(1), 1465 U.N.T.S. 113, 113
(entered into force June 26, 1987); Convention on the Elimination of All forms of Racial Discrimination,
Dec. 21, 1965 (entered into force Jan. 4, 1969), 1249 U.N.T.S. 13.
"57 Official Record of UN Human Rights Treaty Ratifications, http://www.unhchr.ch/pdf/report.pdf.
158 International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, Art. 6 (hereinafter ICESCR) Dec.
16, 1966 (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976), 993 U.N.T.S. 3.
... Id. at art. 13.
" Mulder, supra note 5, at 65. Although the rhetoric of the affirmative action debate in the United States
is couched in terms of individual rights, and although I have distinguished the United States from India
because the United States adopts an individual-regarding equality approach to affirmative action, Mulder
argues that, by its very nature, affirmative action represents some willingness to acknowledge group rights
no matter what the jurisdiction.
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cultural rights in a country which usually only ratifies first generation rights,
negative, civil and political rights.
A universalist argument can also be made by looking at the outer
circle of India. I have attempted to show, and other commentators agree, that
"India's program is . . . the boldest effort by any country at reverse
discrimination. ' 6 ' Yet, just because India has a very liberal affirmative
action plan in its reservation system does not represent a different cultural
acceptance for the idea of reverse discrimination. Quite the contrary,
reservations appear to be more controversial in India than either of the other
two jurisdictions. When Prime Minister V.P. Singh announced the
implementation of the Mandal Commission Report, thousands of students in
India rose up in protest, boycotting classes, blocking traffic, hijacking
busses, smashing car windshields, and hurling stones at police. 162 In 1990,
Rajeev Goswami, a twenty-year old Brahmin university student in Delhi
soaked himself in gasoline and lit himself on fire in front of friends and
classmates to protest Prime Minister V.P. Singh's implementation of the
Mandal Commission Report. 163 While he was burning, he said his intention
was to "reignite a movement that would have died without his sacrifice.1' 64
While doctors eventually saved Goswami, 65 others were not so lucky, as a
wave of suicides by self-immolation,'" hanging, and swallowing
insecticide 67 swept the nation. One student even "left a suicide note
donating her eyes to Prime Minister V.P. Singh so that he could see for
himself the misery that the Mandal Commission Report had brought upon the
student community. ' ' 16' There were also murders, such as the fourteen year
old school girl from Delhi who was soaked in gasoline and burned to
death. 69 The very same day, protesters set a train carriage on fire in
Hyderabad, killing forty people. The fact that India, with the most liberal of
the three affirmative action programs, has also been the scene of the most
vehement protest, is strong proof of the universal nature of human rights.
The universality of human rights means that everyone, across cultures, shares
some notion of what should be a protected right and what should not. The
161 Prior, supra note 2, at 66 n.14.
62 Id. at 64, 64 n.8.
'
6' Id. at 63.
'6 Id. at 63 n.3.
165 Id. (reporting that "Goswami was hospitalized with severe bums on over 500/o of his body" but later
"was elected president of the Delhi University Students' Union and renewed his drive to end caste-based
job reservations").
'6 Id. at 63 n.4.
167 Id. at 64 n.9.
168 id.
'69 ld. at 64-65.
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fact that, across the three jurisdictions, public protests increase as affirmative
action rights are strengthened indicates that a universal shared consciousness
does exist, and that an ideal, universally acceptable affirmative action plan
may fall somewhat short of Indian reservations.
Finally, the Indian model looks significantly more similar to Europe
and the United States when one considers gender-based reservations in India
instead of caste-based reservations. Although the Indian Constitution
specifically allows for affirmative action based on sex,' 70 and the Supreme
Court has upheld some affirmative action measures intended to benefit
women,17 1 gender-based reservations are drastically less advanced than caste-
based reservations in two ways. First, a bill seeking to reserve a third of the
seats in Parliament and State Assemblies for women has been indefinitely
postponed in the lower house of Parliament.172  Thus, gender-based
reservations have garnered nowhere near the level of national support and
attention as caste-based reservations as was evidenced through the Mandal
Commission and corresponding Supreme Court decisions. Second, court
decisions upholding gender-based reservations look much more like their
European and American counterparts, holding that affirmative action based
on gender is acceptable only if it is a "tip the scales" and not "absolute" type
of preference.1
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The combined effect of these similarities outweighs the differences I
have outlined in the approaches to affirmative action in the United States,
Europe, and India. Consequently, affirmative action poses no significant
threat to the universality of human rights.
VII. CONCLUSION
I have argued in this paper that the respective politics of affirmative
action programs in the United States, Europe, and India can be seen as a set
of concentric circles: The United States has the most restrictive policies and
thus represents the smallest circle; Europe represents a middle circle, whose
policies are generally less restrictive than the United States; and the most
liberal policies are found in India. In most, but not all, areas, however,
70 NDIAN CONST. art. 15 § 3.
71 YusufAbdul Aziz v. State of Bombay A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 321 (Vol. 41, C. N. 77) (upholding Dattatraya
v. State of Bombay, 1953 A.I.R. 40 (Born.) 311 (approving reservations for women on elected municipal
council)).
172 Sumita Ray, Note and Comment: The Women's Reservation Bill ofIndia: A Political Movement
Towards Equality for Women, 13 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 53,59 (1999). Ray notes that,
interestingly, the Bill was blocked by parliamentarians representing Other Backward Classes, who
demanded that 27% of the 33% quota for women be reserved for Other Backward Class women. Id. at 65.
173 Id. at 64 (citing Dattatraya, supra note 171, at 313-14).
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European policies are closer to their United States than their Indian
counterparts. Dividing the concept of equality into individual-regarding
equality and group-regarding equality, India is closer to group-regarding
equality while both Europe and the United States favor individual-regarding
equality. Dividing equality into formal and substantive equality, India is
closer to substantive equality while the United States is closer to formal
equality. Europe, between these two extremes, has been adopting a more
substantive notion of equality, moving it away from the United States and
closer to India. Discussion of the meaning of quotas, also, is characterized
by a general situation in which Europe/US contrast from a more liberal
Indian approach; but, a more nuanced view shows the European approach to
still be somewhat more liberal than the American one.
While the United States and India consistently represent the
respective liberal and conservative approaches to affirmative action, there are
several areas in which policies in Europe tend more towards those in India
than the United States. Both Europe and India adopt a general remedial
rationale which is not accepted in the states. European policy also adopts a
test similar to the Indian creamy layer concept, which has been rejected in
the United States. Finally, there is even one area in which Europe could
potentially exceed the liberal Indian policies: while United States
affirmative action affects relatively low percentages of seats and Indian
reservations can legally control half of the seats, it is legally possible that
affirmative action in Europe could meet or exceed this 50% threshold.
Although this paper focuses on distinguishing the different
approaches to affirmative action, and many differences have been identified,
affirmative action does not pose a substantial threat to the universality of
human rights. First, the very presence of affirmative action in all three
jurisdictions adds strength to the universalist case. Second, the respective
debates often center around similar issues. Third, affirmative action is an
example of a second generation, positive state duty to promote economic,
social, and cultural rights in the United States, a country which usually only
ratifies first generation rights, negative, civil and political rights. Its very
presence in the United States thus further strengthens the universalist
argument. Fourth, there appears to be some logical correlation between the
breadth of the policy adopted and the level of controversy it creates,
suggesting that there is some level of affirmative action that is more
universally acceptable. Finally, affirmative action programs look
significantly more similar when "like is compared with like," namely when
the affirmative action under comparison in all three jurisdictions is based on
gender.
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While affirmative action will certainly remain controversial in all the
jurisdictions under study, I hope this paper can add in some way to a better
understanding of the issues that all jurisdictions consider when formulating
an affirmative action program. Affirmative action is one of those complex
areas of human rights in which one right is at tension with another; in this
case, affirmative action on behalf of an individual based on their group
membership is in tension with standard equal protection of the individual,
which holds all individuals absolutely equal. In the United States and
Europe, this is a legal tension; in India, which legally accepts group-
regarding equality, this tension is nevertheless present in the streets of
Hyderabad. But, we should not believe this conflict is insurmountable, as
opponents of affirmative action contend. Nor is affirmative action the only
place in which human rights come in to conflict. These are just the sorts of
areas where we stand to benefit the most from a comparative approach to
legal understanding. Thoroughly examining the way in which several
jurisdictions deal with the tensions affirmative action creates can help all
jurisdictions create the most fair, equitable, and thorough plan possible. In
an area as important as affirmative action, which has such potential to protect
human rights directly, efficiently, and locally, we should not accept anything
less than the most thorough, comparative examination.
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